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The ability of developing  countries and the new transitional
economies  to compete  in the global  marketplace  will depend  on
their ability to transform  industrial  relations  policies  involving
trade unions and collective bargaining  so that  they promote
flexibility in the workplace  and encourage  the fornation and
effective  use of human  resources.
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Katz, Kuruvilla, and Turner assert that changing  Recent pressures for structural change in the
world markets and new technologies are driving  developing world present an opportunity for
industrial restructuring. The ability of developing  major transitions in industrial relations.
countries and the new transitional economies to
compete in the global marketplace will depend  Drawing on the Japanese and German
on their ability to transform industrial relations  experiences, as well as experiences in the
policies involving trade unions and collective  developing world, Katz, Kuruvilla, and Turner
bargaining so that they promote flexibility in the  focus on lessons that can be applied in guiding
workplace and encourage the formation and  this transformation.
-ffective use of human resources.
Worker participation in decisionmaking,
History has shown, they say, that there are  they contend, is critical for bringing about the
certain key moments of transition in industrial  essential popular acceptance of changes that will
relations systems. After that time, systems get set  come with industrial restructuring.
and are hard to mcdify. Often these key
moments are the result of legislative changes  It is also important to coordinate and inte-
(such as the National Labor Relations Act and  grate industrial relations policy with other social,
the emergence of public sector unions after the  legal, economic, and educational policies. The
burgeoning of public sector legislation ir- mae  education system, for example, should not be
United States). Sometimes they are the result of  overproducing college graduates when there is
key historical or economic junctures (such as the  an undersupply of unskilled and skilled workers.
postwar reconstruction in Japan and Germany,
and independence movements in the developing
world).
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We live in an era of industrial  relations  reform and transformation. This is true across a
wide range of advanced, newAy  Industrializing  and developing  countries. While thirty years ago it was
commonplace  among social scientists  to assume  that in the long run other countries  would converge  on
variants of the  'most advanced" U.S. model of collective bargaining and industrial relations, this
assumption  has been swept aside by history. The rise and success  of very  different models  in countries
such  as Japan  and Germany  has  demonstrated  both  a cross-national  diversity  of stable  industrial  relations
pattems and new lessons  regarding  what  does and does not work. The purpose  of this paper is to draw
out,  from both more and less  successful  recent  cases,  some  contemporary  lessons  for industrial  relations
reform efforts, especially for developing  countries, and for the transitional  economies of Central and
Eastern  Europe.
The important  starting point is a recognition  of the impact  of changing  world markets  and
new technologies in driving industrial restructuring and industrial relations  transformation.  Above all,
perhaps, the rapid growth of Japanese economic strength, rooted in part in a successful system of
enterprise  unionism  and shopfloor  teamwork,  has put pressure  on firms in other countries  to reorganize
production and work and to seek some kind of unew  industrial relations." Within Europe, not only the
advent of  Japanese  competition but the relative  success of German industry  and industrial relations,
along with the more recent 'relaunch"  of European  economic integration,  has pressured  British, French,
Italian  and Spanish  (among  other) firms  to reorganize. Everywhere,  intensified  world market  competition
has called into question established  relationships  and ways of doing things, and called forth managerial
imperatives  to raise productivity and product quality, achieve new flexibility,  and cut costs.
At the  same time,  and closely  related,  the past fifteen  years have  witnessed  a rapid  spread
of new microelectronic  technologies in the workplace. "New production  concepts,' often based on the
new  technology,  aim to make more flexible  use of labor, both in the products  produced and the process.
As managers  demand more responsibility  from (and sometimes  even  give "semi-autonomy"  to) individual
workers and groups of workers, traditional labor-management  relationships  are called into question.2
So widespread  are these  changes  In the modem  workplace,  especially  in advanced
societies,  that many  have  declared  the era of Fordism  at its end. "Post-Fordisma  has  been  variously
defined  and  labeled  as flexible  specialization,  flexible  automation,  lean  production,  and  diversified  quality
production,  to name  a few. Critics  have  called  i  neo-Fordismm  or management-by.stress,"  implying  a
more  sophisticated  form of mrnanaerial  control  over  the workforce  (Parker  and Slaughter  1988). But
however  one interprets  the new  developments,  there  is general  agreement  that the  modem  workplace
is undergoing  major  changes.  Part  and  parcel  of these  changes  is  a widespread  rethinking  of established
pattems  of industrial  relations.
In some  cases,  employers  have  gone  on the offensive  against  union  influence  that is
perceived  to defend  rigidiies  in the workplace  and stand  In the way  of nAcessary  work  reorganization.
In other cases,  employers  have  sought  a new  collaborative  relationship  with  entrenched  unions;  and
sometimes  the  second  strategy  has  followed  the first. Unions,  for their  part,  have  in some  cases  fought
against  the changes  and defended  the traditional  ways  on which  their  power  is based. But in other
cases,  unions  have  demonstrated  a willingness  to cooperate  In new ways,  both  to save  jobs and to
promote  the human-side  benefits  of more  flexible  work  organization.  And in some  cases,  where  they
have  not  been  excluded,  unions  have  played  a proactive  reformist  role,  pushing  management  toward  new
forms  of organization  such  as group  work.  In addition,  the  state,  through  public  policy,  has  often  played
an important  role (through  regulation,  deregulation,  or other policy  changes)  in promoting  industrial
relations  reform.
In the interaction  of world mnarket  changes,  new technologies,  and the strategies  of
governments,  employers,  and unions,  there is, theretore,  considerable  fermentation  and change  in
contemporary  industrial  relations  in advanced  societies. For different  reasons,  although  not wholly
unrelated,  there  is also pressure  for change  and in some  cases  full-fledged  transformation  within  the
newiy  industrialized  countries  (NlC's),  some  developing  countries,  and  the various  countries  of Eastem
Europe  and  the former  Soviet  Union. In this period  of uncertainty,  trial  and error,  and change,  there  is
also  a great  deal  of cross-national,  intertirm,  and  interunion  communication  and  exchange.  No  one  wants3
to reinvent  the wheel;  less successful  firms and countries  attempt  to leam  the lessons  of the more
successful,  especially  Japan  and  Germany.  Sorting  out  the  positive  and  applicable  lessons  has  become
a major  preoccupation  for managers,  and  to a lesser  extent  for  govemments  and  unions.  The  opportunity
to leam  and combine  lessons  from  various  versions  of successful  (if not 'best T ) practice  is one of the
benefits  of Intense  contemporary  processes  of economic  globalization.
Nowhere  is this need  greater  than  among  developing  countries  and the emerging  and
unstable  democracies  of Eastem  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union.  We  want  to emphasize,  however,
at the outset:  it is not possible  to transplant  another  model,  either  discrete  elements  or the model  in its
entirety. In every  case,  it Is necessary  to build on existing  practices  and institutions,  or institutional
remnants.  How  the lessons  presented  in  this paper  can  be adapted  for specific  use  in  specific  national
settings  Is  a matter  for careful  case-by-case  study  and experimentation.
B. Industrial  Rellatons  Issues  In DeveloDina  Countris
The  changing  economic  environment  confronting  third  world  countries  makes  it Imperativf,
that they  take  immediate  decisions  regarding  industrial  restructuring.
The Economic  Context
In the 1980s,  the U.N.  General  Assembly  set  a target  of 7 percent  for third  world  growth.
This  target  was  based  on estimations  that  a 7 percent  growth  rate  was  the  bare  minimum  for developing
economies  to provide  basic  needs  (food,  shelter,  clothing  and education)  of their  populations.  However,
the record  after 1960  has been  disappointing,  as most developing  countries  plunged  into deep and
continuing  economic  crises  (Singh  1992). On average,  GDP  growth  rates  during  the 1980s  were  well
below  5 percent  and  a number  of countries  experienced  substantial  declines  in  national  income.  Although
African  economies  grew  at 3.5  percent  between  1960-73,  the  rate  of growth  was  1.3  in 1981,  and  negative
thereafter.  Mexico's  GDP  grew  at 7 percent  between  1977-1981,  but 1982-1988  saw  negative  growth.
Estmates  (after  GDP  figures  are  adjusted  for terms  of trade  and net factor  payments)  indicate  that the4
average  per capita  Income  in Latin  American  countries  was lower  by 15  percent  and for African  countries
lower by 30 percent in 1989,  relative  to 1980. Real  wages in Africa have declined by about 20 percent
and in Mexico, by almost 50 rercent between 1982 and 1987. The inability of third world countries to
compete  in world manufacturinig  has  also resulted  in deindustrialization  in many countries  (e.g.,  Tanzania,
where manufacturing  production shrank by 25 percent during the 1980s).
These  economic pressures  have  forced developing  nations  into increased  indebtedness,
resulting in an increased burden of debt servicing.  In the  1980s interest payments for most Latin
American  and African  countries comprised about 30 percent  of the national  budget, seriously  affecting
ability to import necessary  capital and technology  for production and exports. Sachs (1990) suggests
that the collapse of living standards  in the third world in the 1980s  (he calls the 1980s  the lost  decade
of economic development) is intimately related to the extemal debt crisis and shows that economic
performance  has been  disastrous  in countries  that  experienced  debt service  difficulties. In  addition,  there
was in the 1980s  a net outflow of capital  from the third world, in spite of large  transfer  payments  via aid
into the third world.
Exceptions  to this bleak scenario  are the experiences  of some Asian countries (mainly
the newly industrializing  countries),  which showed  increases  in GDP  growth rates  and per capita income,
and achieved  both ILO and U.N. targets. The three main features  that appear  to account  for the dramatic
relative  economic success of the Asian nations  are: economic structure,  economic and industrialization
policies, and lower indebtedness  (thus insuring  relative  protection  from changes in world interest rates)
(Singh 1992).
Experts  by and large  agree that both extemal  factors (world interest  rates, terms  of trade
that discriminate  against developing  countries)  and flawed domestic colicies are important in explaining
economic decline, although there is debate regarding the relative  impact of both. There is, however,
consensus that the central problem for these countries  is that & nigh long-term  rate of economic growth
is an economic and social imperative.  There is also consensus  that developing  nations are not likely  to
reach  target growth rates of 7-8 percent without  fundamental  changes in the structure  of their economies5
and economic  policies.  Finally,  there  is consensus  that  these  countries  need  to improve  the utilization
and  management  of their  human  resources.  F'fective  Industrial  relations  practices  are  needed  to achieve
those  ends.
The  key  aims  of an industrial  relations  policy  should  be  to foster  stable  and participatory
labor-management  relations  so as to facilitate  flexible  adaptations  in response  to changing  economic
environments.  Industrial  relations  characteristics  can  hinder  the  development  of stable  and participatory
labor-management  relations  systems.
Industrbal  Relatlons  Characteristics
Although  industrial  relations  systems  in  developing  couintries  are  diverse,  they  often  share
certain  common  characteristics  that inhibit  the development  of successful  industrial  relations  practices.
An illustrative  (not  exhaustive)  list  of such  characteristics  includes  a central  role  for the state  in economic
planning  and industrial  relations  regulation,  weak and political  unions,  unwieldy  dispute resolution
mechanisms,  inappropriate  union  and  bargaining  structures,  the  frequent  absence  of genuine  collective
bargaining,  and poorly  educated  workforces.
The  State  and Industrial  Relations  Policy. The  state  is the major  actor in the industrial
relations  systems  of developing  countries,  and from a conceptual  standpoint,  state policy can be
classified  into  two primary  approaches,  the "equity  approach"  and  the "efficiency  approach."  It must  be
remembered  that  there  are  substantial  variations  in  third  world  industrial  relations  practices,  and  that  these
approaches  are  perhaps  oversimplifications,  but  are  used  here  for illustrative  purposes.  Many  countries
have  elements  of both  approaches.
The "equity"  approach  accepts the principles  of free collective  bargaining  and is
characterized  by protectionist  labor  legislation  and social  welfare  policies.  Protective  labor  legislation  is
extensive  under  this regime,  and impinges  on the employer's  cost and flexibility.  Typically,  protective
legislation  includes:  restriction  on layoffs  with  substantial  layoff  compensation  to be  paid  (e.g.,  half  salary
for  first  90  days  in  India);  govemment-required  permission  to close  plants;  the  requirement  to give  unions6
extensive  notice before  altering  plant operations;  unfettered  trade union rights:  wEltfare  regulations
mandating  the  provision  of food at subsidized  rates  and  day  care  facilities  at all Industrial  factories;  and
legislation  mandating  extensive  employer-paid  benefits.
The  motivation  for  the  equity  approach  often  represents  a political  bargain  between  unions
and ruling  governments,  who were  perhaps  partners  in the  struggle  for independence,  but also  reflects
reaction  to populist  pressures,  and the need  for legitimacy  gained  from ILO membership.  A partial
justification  for the equity approach is that in the absence  of govemment-run  social security  and
unemployment  compensation  programs,  and  weaknesses  within  labor  movements,  employers  must  bear
the cost,  and  labor  should  be  protected.  Adoption  of an  import  substitution  industrialization  policy,  with
substantial  protection  for domestic  industries  fom intemational  competition,  further  reinforces  the equity
approach.  Many  former  British  colonies  in  Asia  and  Africa  exemplify  this  approach.  It  is important  to note
that the equity  approach  is not  always  equitable  within  each  country,  as these  policies  often  apply  only
to the modem  industrial  sector,  often  a very  small  part  of developing  economies.
The "efficiency"  model, on the other  hand, provides  entrepreneurs  with considerable.
freedom  over  labor  issues.  Although  labor  welfare  policies  (working  hours,  minimum  wages,  prohibition
of child  employment)  are perhaps  similar  to the policies  of countries  following  the equity  model,  in the
efficiency  approach  trade  union  rights  are  restricted.  Examples  of these  restrictions  include: prevention
of unions  from political  activity;  curtailment  of the scope  of collective  bargaining  (unions  restricted  from
bargaining  on promotions,  transfers,  job assignments,  layoffs,  hiring,  etc.);  prohibition  against  strikes;
banning  of unions  in  certain  areas  of the  economy  (e.g.,  in  export  processing  zones);  and  noncompliance
with  various  ILO  resolutions  regarding  the  freedom  of association.  The  efficiency  model  appears  prevalent
in countries  that have  adopted  an export-oriented  industrialization  policy  during  the 1970s  (e.g.,  South
Korea,  Taiwan,  Malaysia,  Philippines)  (Deyo  1989).
It is important  to note  that countries  often  follow  both  approaches  simultaneously.  Many
countries  enact  protectionist  and  welfare-oriented  policies  consistent  with  the  equity  approach,  but  restrict
trade  union  rights.  African  examples  of this duality  include  the following:  govemments  in Zambia  and7
Burkina  Faso  have  arrested  union  'oaders:  the Nigerian  government  has  restructured  unions  and the
Nigerian  labor  congress  was  dissolved  in the 198Ws;  wage  ceilings  have been  imposed  in Tanzania,
Nigeria,  and Kenya;  the subject  of bargaining  has  been  rstricted In Zambia;  and many  other  countries
have  introduced  structural  reforms  of trade  unions  via  legislation  designed  to reduce  their  influence  (e.g.,
Algeria,  Egypt,  Ethiopia,  Nigeria,  Tanzania  and Zambba).
Both approaches  have their problems.  The equity approach  can be praised  for its
enlightened  social  protection  and  adherence  to the  principles  of freedom  of association  enshrined  in  ILO
conventions.  However,  it can  be criticized  for is excessive labor  protection,  excessive  poliicization  of
unions,  unfettered  trade  union  rights,  and imposition  of social  costs  on the employer  that impinge  on
competitiveness  and adaptability  to changing  environments,
The efficiency  approach  Is advantageous  since  it often  appears  to be integrated  with
industrialization  strategies  necessary  for rapid  econornic  development.  Yet,  i; can  be  faulted  for Uts  labor
suppression,  which,  over  the long  term  (e.g.,  South  Korea)  results  In conflict  and the destabilization  of
industrial  relations.  What  is important,  and what  third  world  countries  have  not  achieved,  is an industrial
relations  policy  that  balances  the  two  approaches  and  is Integrated  with  the  broader  economic  and  social
policies  that are  needed  to meet  development  objectives.
Unions  and Politics.  The  politial character  of unions  has  been  well  documented  (e.g.,
Essenberg  1981). In muitiparty  democracies  (e.g.,  India),  political  parties  depend  on trade  unions  for
support,  and in single party democracies  (many  African  nations),  unions  face pressures  to align
themselves  with  the  party  structure.  The  weakness  of  third  world  unions  vis-a-vis  employers  forces  unions
to pursue  methods  to gain what they cannot accomplish  via traditional  economic  and bargaining
methods.
This  paper  does  not  argue  that  trade  unions  should  not  pursue  political  action  to achieve
their goals. Rather,  we wam  against  excessively  political  unions,  and the subordination  of economic
objectives  and methods  to political  objectives  and methods.  Excessively  political  unions  inhibit  the8
development  of stable  union-management  relations.  Two  unfavorable  outcomes  of excessive  political
unionism,  using  India  as an example,  are  cited  below.
Unlon  leadership  in India  is  a stepping  stone  to party  leadership.  Aspiring  party  leaders
also serve  as elected  leaders  of the local trade unions in firms where  they are not employed.
Consequently,  union policies  reflect  the priorities  of the political  party,  and are not sensitive  to the
economic  situation  of the local  firm. It is common,  for instance,  for political  parties  to call nationwide
strikes  for political  reasons  that have  little  to do with  economic  issues  (Ramaswamy  1983).
Indian  law  allows  multiple  unions  in enterprises.  Since  each  party  has  its own  trade  union
wing,  there  are  multiple  unions  in each  enterprise.  Since  each  union  strives  to increase  its membership,
there  is constant  competition  for membership  loyalty. Workers  in the plants  shift  their  allegiance  from
unions  that fail  to deliver  to unions  that promise  to do so.  Given  this interunion  rivalry,  stable  labor-
management  relations  do not develop. For stability  to develop,  a single  bargaining  agent in each
enterprise  is required.  Yet  legislative  efforts  in tiis direction  have  repeatedly  failed,  given  that  this is not
in the interest  of competing  political  parties  and unions. Multi-unionism  (along  with  the constitutional
nrocedures  that  mandate  annual  union  elections)  thus  typically  requires  Indian  management  to negotiate
with  a different  set of leaders  at erch contract  renewal. Given  this, along  with the political  nature  of
unions,  managements  have  little  incentive  to invest  in developing  long  term  relationships  with  any  single
union,  and union  leaders  have  little  incentive  to pursue  long  term  policies  that meet  firms'  needs.
Weak  Unions.  A number  of characteristics  interact  in  most  third  world  industrial  relations
systems  to produce  weak unions,  which hinder  the establishment  of genuine  and stable collective
bargaining.  These  factors  include:  the  relatively  small  industrial  sector  that is usually  organized  (typicaliv,
the  unorganized  informal  and  agricultural  sectors  are  much  larger  than  the  industrial  sector);  the  relatively
uneducated  labor  force  which  can  be  manipulated  by leaders  who have  goals  different  from  those  of the
members  and the firm (e.g.,  the incidence  of nsweetheart  contracts"  is estimated  to be 20 percent  in
India);  the  existence  of multi-unionism  which  serves  to fragment  the  labor  movement  nationally  and  at  the
workplace  level; the absence  of legislation  promoting  single  bargaining  agents  inside  firms and an9
orderly  bargaining  structure; repressive  state  policies  that  grant decertification  and deregistration  powers
to govemment  officials;  successful  employer  opposition to union formation; government persecution  of
labor leaders; the absence of a unified  employers  association that could inspire stable industrial level
bargaining;  and union constitutions  that mandate  union elections  on a yearly basis thus preventing  the
development  of long-term plans by union leaders.  Needless  to say this list only highlights some of the
problems leading to weak unions. It is relevant  to note that union densities in developing countries
(calculated  as a percentage  of the non agricultural  labor  force) ranges  from 1 percent (e.g., Upper Volta.
Haiti)  to about 25 percent (e.g., Argentina),  with the mean well under 20 percent (Kurian 1985).
Weak unions imply unstable industrial relations as managements  use their power to
restrict unions  and are able to push through agreements  that leave  workers  unsatisfied,  leading  to shop-
floor conflict.  Consequently,  unions turn to the political resolution  of issues  that cannot be s3lved via
bargaining. As a result, unions rely more  and more on dispute resolution  mechanisms,  particularly  since
their weakness  leads  them to push every  grievance  to a disputa  for fear of otherwise losing membership.
In  this environment,  unions cannot  take a long-term  view  of the labor-management  relationship  as all their
energies  are focused  on sh-ort  term issues. Meanwhile,  employers  have  little incentive  to deal with weak
and therefore,  unreliable  unions. Thus,  there is little  development  of the trust and cooperation  necessary
for quality production,  flexibility, and long term stable labor relations.
DisDute Resolution Systems.  An effective dispute resolution system encourages the
parties  to reach bilateral  solutions  to disputes, thereby  enhancing  the development  of a stable collective
bargaining relationship. Most third world systems, however,  have the opposite effect:  they produce
excessive  reliance  on third party intervention.
Many dispute resolution  procedures  have been inherited  from the colonial  occupiers, or
have been  adapted (often selectively)  from successful  models  in the industrialized  world: often they have
been designed primarily  to stop interruptions  in the production process (Damachi 1986). Although  the
range of mechanisms  vary, a few central characteristics  are common to developing countries.10
Most  dispute  resolution  procedures  Impose  iimitations  on  strikes.  Rather  than  allow  unions
to use  their  economic  strength,  strikes  2re curtailed.  For example,  workers  cannot  continue  their  strike
while  a dispute  is under  conciliation,  mediation,  arbitraton  or is being  decided  by a labor  court.
Govemment  officials  are often  given  the power  to Intervene  in disputes  and suggest
solutions,  or even  mandate  s ilutions.
Most conciliation,  mediation,  and arbitration  services  are carried  out by government
departments.  This  subjects  the  procedure  to political  interference  (Lansing  and  Kuruvilla  1987j.  Influential
political  leaders  (who  may  be leaders  of unions,  or have  influence  over  key  ministers  and secretaries  in
the labor  ministries  of these  countries)  can  often  exercise  influence  over  conciliators  and mediators.
The  effectiveness  of the procedures  suffers  from  delays  as  well  as  the lack  of adequately
trained  officials  in govemment  dispute  resolution  departments.  In most  cases,  if the  dispute  is not  settled
through  mediation  at the local  level,  it is then  transferred  to the  regional  level,  and  finally  to the  state  level
of mediation.  If it is still  not resolved,  it Is  transferred  to the Minister  of Labor  in each  state,  or referred  to
compulsory  arbitration,  the labor court  or an industrial  tribunal.  Resolution  of disputes  thus can take
months  or even  years.  The  authority  granted  to concilistors  and mediators  to refer  disputes  to binding
arbitration,  labor  courts,  or industrial  tribunals  introduces  further  delay  into  the  dispute  resolution  process.
The  weakness  of unions  actually  encourages  the  use  of such  procedures  i.e.,  a "narcotic
effect".  Unions  tend  to rely  on dispute  resolution  procedures  in  order  to obtain  what  they  cannot  obtain
through  direct  collective  bargaining.  In situations  where  multi-unionism  exists,  the dependence  is much
higher,  given  that unions  have  to constantly  raise  issues  to attract  membership,  as a result  of union
competition.
The Pressures  on Industrial Relations
In response  to economic  pressures,  most  developing  countries  (and  this  applies  equally
to the middle  income  countries  of Eastem  Europe)  face pressure  to liberalize  their  economies.  This
liberalization  implies  a  change  in  industrial  strategy,  from  an  isolationist  import-substitution  industrialization11
(1S) policy with Its attendant protectionist programs (see for example, the current liberalization  in the
Indian economy), to a more export-oriented  economy that is integrated with the world market.  This
transition  Is  apparent  In  Asia  where  many  countries  (e.g.,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Indonesia,  Thailand,  India)
have  shifted or are shifting into more export-oriented  strategies.  The transition  is less  apparent in Africa,
where there Is nonetheless  evidence of moverrent in this direction.  The integration of these export-
oriented economies into the world marketplace  has substantial  implications  for industrial relations.
Export-oriented  development  requires  industrial  relations  systems  that  are flexibleand  able
to adapt to change. For many developing countries, this implies a drastic restructuring of industrial
relations  policies at  the national,  firm,  and work place  levels. If third world economies  are to successfully
integrate and compete in the world market (and World Bank policy prescriptions push them in this
direction),  they have to compete  with modem production  and industrial  relations  practices. Th;s  implies
that late developers  cannot just follow the development  paths  of the advanced  countries  with a lag, such
as the traditional U.S. based mass production (Fordist) strategy. Instead, developing countries must
quickly create more flexible systems.  For example, many of the NIC's involved in export oriented
industrial relations have had to adopt production techniques  similar  to those used in the industrialized
world in order to compete successfully.  The requirement  to compete with best practice implies  a
"quantum leapu  for most countries,  and underscores  the  urgent  need  to address industrial  relations  issues.
Although  the organized  sector is very small compared  to the unorganized  and informal sectors  of most
developing  economies,  the need for flexible  industrial  relations  policies is still paramount,  given  that it is
the organized  sector that plays a central role in industrialization,  exports, and structural  adjustment.
This is not an easy task, since there are often compelling reasons for the existence  of
inefficient  industrial  relations  characteristics  in the  third world. In equity  based systems,  for example,  laws
limiting employer  flexibility (e.g., limiting employer  freedom to layoff, retrench or close their industries)
exist, in  part, because of the absence ef  altemative sources of  support from the  state (such as
unemployment insurance policies, social security systems, and labor market and training institutions).12
The lack of resources  to establish  social security,  for example,  also explains  why employers  are forced
to provide extensive  retirement  and health benefits.
As a result, the establishment  of appropriate industrial  relations  requires  a rethinking  of
other national policies. A national industrial relations  policy is useless  if viewed in isolation; it must be
linked  to broader  policies  regarding  education,  training, social  security,  etc. This  broader linkage  between
industrial relations  and other policies has by and large been ignored by policymakers.
Below we examine  in detail some of the basic requirements  of any industrial relations
system. We start with basic principles  that should be followed in industrial relations  and then discuss
some of the problems  that have  appeared  in developing  countries conceming  these industrial  relations
features.
C.  Basic Principles of Law  and InstitutIons
Although there are wide variations  in the industrial  relations  characteristics  of advanced
industrial  economies,  successful  countries  appear  to share  certain  basic principles  of law  and institutions
germane  to industrial relations.
The Need for Unlons, the Right to Strike, and Collective Bargaining
Modem  industrial  relations  requires  that  workers be  afforded  the basic right  to form unions
and those unions should be granted the right to bargain collectively  with employers and to strike if a
negotiated settlement  is not reached. The social advantages  gained from the provision of those rights
are revealed  in the experiences  of industrialized  countries. The  advantages  include the fact that workers
are entitled  to a say in the determination  of their employment  and working conditions. Not only is such
input  justified  on rights  grounds, but in addition,  contemporary  experience  shows  that to compete  in world
markets  requires  the active participation  and commitment  of the work force in order to meet  quality and
product performance  standards.
There  also are clear virtues  derived from industrial  relations  systems  that give  the parties
involved in the production process direct involvement in the determination of work conditions and13
employment  terms. Employers  and workers  and their representatives  know  their own problems  best and
also can be remarkably  adept at devising practical solutions to problems  or conflicts. Interference  by
outside  parties In  the resolution of problems  often leads  to apparent  solutions  that prove unworkable  or
impractical  in the long run.
Furthermore, third party interference  eliminates the constructive learning the parties
receive  in problem resolution  and identification  as they work through  their own problems. Even  if a third
party could impose  a solution that solves  a problem in the short  term, this process prevents  the parties
from developing the capacity to  solve their own problems.  Thus a clear advantage to  collective
bargaining  is that it avoids a cycle of dependence  on third party interference.
Experience  in the industrialized  countries  also shows  that unions,  the right to strike,  and
collective  bargain.ng  are more likely  to produce  outcomes  that are acceptable  to workers  and employers
as compared  to solutions  that  are imposed  by govemments  or other third  parties. Not only  are employers
and workers  more likely  to develop  solutions  that meet  their  own needs,  these  parties  are also more likely
to feel a commitment  to making such solutions work. Imposed  employment  terms in contrast are often
resented and resisted in part because the parties who must live with these terms had little say in their
development. Thus, the process  through which employment  terms are set is often as important as the
actual  terms themself. Collective  bargaining  has the advantage  of being  a process  that is "owned"  by the
parties involved.
Since collective bargaining is a healthy process, it should be applied widely.  This
suggests  that the right to strike should be granted in nearly  all cases. There may arise some instances
where  an altemative  to the right to strike  is necessary,  yet experience  demonstrates  that the use of strike
altematives  should be limited. It makes sense,  for example,  to exempt certain public services,  such as
police, firefighter,  or emergency  medical  care,  from the right  to strike. Experience  in North America  shows
that in these cases  the availability  of interest  arbitration (where  a third party determines  the terms of the
labor  contract if an impasse  is reached  in negotiations)  can be a successful  altemative  to the  strike (Olson
1988).14
A country may also benefit  by providing  a national  emergency  dispute resolution
procedure  to limit  the right  to strike  on  a case  by case  basis  In industries  other  than  those  listed  above.
The  United  States  has  such  a procedure  provided  through  the Taft.Hartley  amendments  to the National
Labor  Relations  Act  and  these  procedures  have  worked  well  (Cullen  1968).  Yet,  such  national  emergency
procedures  should  be narrowly  applied  so as to avoid  regular  Interference  into the normal  process  of
collective  bargaining  for all the reasons  outlined  above. Care  should  be taken  in the construction  of
emergency  dispute  regulations  to avoid  the excessive  use  or influence  of such  procedures.
Independent  Mediation  Entitles
A very  constructive  role  can be played  by independent  mediation  entities  in a modem
industrial  relations  system.  As recommended  above,  in nearly  all cases  unions  and employers  should
be allowed  to settle  contract  terms  through  direct  negotiations  that  allow  unions  to engage  in strikes  if
negotiations  reach  impasse. Yet,  third  party  mediation  should  be available  to help  the parties  in their
negotiations.  The  proper  role  of mediation  is  to facilitate  communication  between  labor  and  management
and provide  advice. In the United  States  such  mediation  comes  through  the Federal  Mediation  and
Conciliation  Service  while  in Britain  the Advisory  Conciliation  and  Arbitration  Service  meets  these  needs.
Mediation  should  be accomplished  in a manner  that preserves  the central  place of direct collective
bargaining  between  labor and management.  Mediation  should  not acquire  the power to impose
settlement  terms  as  this  merely  becomes  a vehicle  for third  party  interference  in  bargaining  (Feuille  1979).
For mediation  to serve  such  a function  there  must  be a sufficiently  well  trained  cadre  of
mediators  who  understand  practical  labor  relations  issues.  Countries  that have  recently  experienced  the
spread  of democratic  political  institutions  especially  need  to devote  resources  toward  the  training  of such
mediators.
There  also is an extremely  healthy  role  to be played  by grievance  procedures  or labor
courts  that solve  problems  that  arise  during  the  terms  of contractual  agreements.  Research  shows  that
grievance  procedures  can  provide  employee  voice  and  thereby  lower  employee  tumover  as  well  as  assist15
in the Identification  of problems  and informal  resolution  of conflicts  (Freeman  and Medoff 1984).
Successful  grievance  procedures  are designed  by the parties  who directly use them and not by
govemment  or other  third parties.
In  Europe,  govemmentadministered  laborcourts  commonly  resolve  individual  complaints.
Labor  courts,  like  grievance  arbitration,  can  effectively  settle  problems  and provide  practical  resolution
of problems  and avoid  larger  social  conflicts.  It is possible  for an industrial  relations  system  to contain
both  grievance  arbitration  and labor  courts,  yet  most  national  industrial  relations  systems  emphasize  one
or the other.
Proper  Unlon  Robe
The  earlier  discussion  highlights  the pressing  nature  of current  intemational  competitive
conditions.  There  is clearly  much  for employers  and unions  to focus  on  conceming  how  the  work  place
can produce  employment  terms that are socially  acceptable  and products  that are competitively
successful.  This  does  not imply  that  there  is no role  for unions  to play  as polkical  actors  or participants
in political  debate. It does  suggest,  however,  that the representation  of worker  interests  often  requires
unions  to focus  their  attention  on employment  and work  place  issues.
It also is clear  that socity benefits  trom  the presence  of politically  independent  unions
that are free  from domination  and govemment  control. Such  domination  eliminates  the democratic
representation  of worker  wants  and  constructive  employer-union  interchange.  The  drawbacks  from  state
domination  of unions  are many  including  a violation  of worker  rights. Furthermore,  state dominated
unions  or state  controlled  industrial  relations  systems  tend  to generate  explosive  periodic  conflict.  Such
has  been  the case  in South  Korea  and some  countries  in Latin  and South  America  (Deyo  1989).
As representation  and bargaining  entities,  unions  should  not serve  functions  that are
properly  the don  r  of govemment  social  service  institutions. For example,  there  are proper  social
service  needs  in  the areas  of social  pensions  (e.g.,  social  security)  and  vocational  education  that should
be regulated  and financed  by national  govemments  and/or  regional  govemments.  Unions  not only  are16
poor providers  of such services,  they also become diverted away from the areas where  they can make
more substantial  private and social contributions  by pursing  social welfare  provision  activities. We  do not
intend  to convey  that there is no useful  role  to be played  by unions in the provision  of any social services.
In some countries (e.g., Sweden and Denmark) unions, for example, play a constructive role in the
administration  of unemployment benefits.  And in many countries unions are effectively  involved in
vocational education programs.
Unions  also should not become the vehicle  for the direct provision of consumer  goods
such  as housing or food distribution  as they did in the former Soviet  Union. Not only  are unions  relatively
inefficient  as a distribution and pricing system, consumer goods provision through the union or work
place  also unfairly  and inefficiently  ties workers to specific firms.
These concerns do not mean that unions should be blocked from addressing specific
worker health or  educational issues.  Union administered health and welfare funds  have played
constructive roles in many countries (e.g., Singapore). The point is that social programs should in
general be administered by governments,  while private programs should have narrower bounds and
focus.
Workplace Representation
There are great advantages to an industrial relations  framework that includes parallel
representation  at the workplace through institutions such as works councils.  In the most successful
examples (as in Germany, the Netherlands  and Denmark),  basic pay and work standards  are set in
collective  bargaining  at an industry level  (for an entire industry  or group of industries, either  regionally  or
nationally).  Plant and  firm-level works  councils, composed  of  elected  blue  and  white  collar
representatives,  enforce  the collective  bargaining  agreements  and also  engage  in ongoing discussion  and
negotiation  of plant-specific  issues. Well  functioning  works councils typically have  formal rights, backed
up by national legislation or central collective  bargaining,  to extensive  information  regarding company17
plans,  as well as  to consultation  and in some cases  (usually  personnel  issues)  veto rights in management
decision making.
In  Germany,  works councils  have  integrated  employee  representatives  into management
decision making and provided a flexible instrument  for restructuring  and adaptation.  Although works
councils have imposed some extemal  rigidity on firms (i is more difficult  to hire and especially  to fire),
this has been more  than compensated  for by added intemal  flexibility  (Streeck  1984a). Because  they are
able  to negotiate  relative  employment  security  for the  workforce,  works councils  are more  willing  to accept
internal flexibility  of deployment (Katz  and Sabel 1985). Works councils also push firms to increase  in-
house training and the hiring of apprentices.
Although management decision making can be  slowed in  the  legally-established,
consensus-building process,  managers have important allies in  the  works  councils  to  smooth
implementation once decisions are reached.  Works councilors at  large plants often take on  co-
management  functions, relieving management  of important personnel responsibilities  (Turner 1991).
Works councils also provide a voice for white-collar  employees  who are traditionally  underrepresented
in industrial  relations  systems;  and the councils provide some representation  for employees  even where
unions are weak or absent.
Where works councils function well, they contribute to a virtuous circle that includes
employee voice on important issues, comprehensive  representation,  labor-management  cooperation
(since  the works council identifies  with the interests  of  the firm), high trust based on joint efforts,  flexibility
in labor deployment, and high productivity and product quality (Streeck 1984a).  These plant-level
institutions of codetermination  make i  possible for works councils, unions (often working through the
works councils),  and managers  to build  successful  "productivity  ct)alitions." it is important  to emphasize,
however, that the virtuous circle is possible not just in isolated cases (as in the U.S. and Britain) but
throughout the economy (as in Germany),  and only because  works councils  are established  and defined
in national legislation  and/or a collective  bargaining  agreement.18
The  parallel  representation  afforded  by  works  councils  Is  also  buttressed,  and  made  more
successful,  by  arrangements  at the strategic  level. The i tter include  both  collective  bargaining  between
Industrial  unions  and  employer  associations  and  uniontworks,  council  participation  (also  mandated  by  law
in Germany)  on company  supervisory  boards.  The  presence  of strong  unions  and employment  security
in  Germany  also  help  to make  works  councils  successful.  Enterprise  unions  at large  firms  fulfill  some  of
the works  council  functions  in Japan.  These  include  co-management,  facilitating  labor-management
cooperation,  building  productivity  coalitions,  receiving  extensive  Information  regarding  company  plans,
consultation,  and  giving  a voice  to white-collar  concerns.  Enterprise  unions  are  also  integrated  to some
extent  into management  decision  making  through  firm-level  bodies  such as joint labor-management
committees.  But  as in  the  U.S.  case,  this  form  of plant-level  representation  has  no legal  backing  in  formal
participation  rights  and is weak  or non-existent  for the majority  of workplaces  which  are  non-union.
D. Waoo  Settlnr and Baraalnlna  Stmueture
Two  related  issues  that  are  of central  importance  in industrial  relations  in  any  country  are
the  structures  for wage  setting  and bargaining  (the  latter  is referred  to as  bargaining  structure).  Normally,
there  is  a close  connection  between  these  matters  as wages  are  set  as  part  of  the normal  bargaining  that
occurs  between  employers  and unions.
Bargaining  Structure
A critical choice in the process  of collective  bargaining  is the degree  to which the
bargaining  structure  is centralized.  The  most  extreme  case  of centralized  wage  setting  (w',ich  does  not
involve  collective  bargaining)  occurs  during  incomes  policies  when  a govemment  imposes  pay  standards
that  apply  to all  workers  in the  economy.  Where  there  is no govemment  sanctioned  incomes  policy,  the
common  most  icentralizedK  bargaining  structure  occurs  when  a large  employer  association  negotiates
with  a union  (or  federation  of unions)  and sets  wages  and  other  employment  terms  for all the unionized
employees  in all the firms  that are members  of this employer  association.  Bargaining  in Sweden  until19
recently  was a frequently  cited case  of centralized  bargaining  involving  the LO and SAF. Mid-range
degrees  of centralization  in bargaining  occur  where  a single  labor  contract  is  applied  to all  the unionized
workers  in  all the plants  of a single  company  or industry.  The  most  decentralized  case  is where  wages
and  other  terms  in  the labor  contract  are set  in a contract  that covers  only  the workers  in  a single  plant
(or a subset  of the york force  in a plant).
The D1advantages  of Fragmented  Bargaining  Structures
The challenge  in developing  countries  is to develop wage setting and bargaining
structures  that meet the parties'  needs  and the pressures  of intemational  competitive  forces.  For
instance,  highly  fragmented  bargaining  units  should  be  avoided.  A number  of problems  have  appeared
in industrialized  countries  in situations  where  bargaining  units  were  too fragmented  and numerous.  In
Britain,  for example,  the presence  of multiple  craft and industrial  union  bargaining  is said to be an
impediment  to integrstive  problem  solving  and  the  effective  introduction  of technological  change  (Ulman
1968). A large number  of bargaining  units also contributes  to inflationary  pressures  through the
promotion  of wage  imitation  and leapfrogging  across  jurisdictions  (Flanagan,  Ulman  and  Soskice  1983).
The Virtues  of Coordinated  Bargaining
One  potential  solution  to the bargaining  unit  fragmentation  problem  is to conduct  wage
bargaining  at the level  of industrial  sectors.  In Germany,  for example,  bargaining  occurs  within  16  major
industrial  sectors.  The  German  structure  has  the  advantage  of inducing  unions  to consider  broad  worker
economic  interests.  So for example,  because  unions  in  Germany  often  include  workers  from  a variety
of companies  and  industries,  there  has  been  less  trade  protectionist  sentiment  within  German  unions  as
these  unions  often  include  members  whose  livelihood  depends  on  the  export  success  of their  employers.
In this  way,  particular  firm or  industry  interests  become  muted  in  the  bargaining  process  (Streeck  1984a).
The  coordination  across  work groups  provided  in the Gerrnan  bargaining  structure  meshes  with other20
aspects  of German  Industrial  relations  to produce was has been  called a "coordinated  market  economy"
(Soskice  1990).
Another  successful  altemative  bargaining  structure  Is  enterprise  bargaining  of  the sort  that
occurs in Japan. The advantage  of enterprise  bargaining  is that it is very responsive  to the economic
conditions facing particular  firms.  The potential problem of inflationary  leapfrogging  across enterprise
unions is dampened in the Japanese  system through the simultaneous  occurrence  of wage bargaining
that occurs in the "Spring Offensive"  each year.  In the annual offensive  the various enterprise unions
communicate  extensively  with one another and often discuss  wage demands  with their respective  union
federations.  In this process, wage demands are coordinated and take account of macroeconomic
circumstances.  Japanese  enterprise  wage bargaining  also has  the advantage  of often  including  a sizeable
share  of pay increases  in the form of annual bonuses  that are influenced  by the economic per!ormance
of the firm.  The advantage of linking pay directly to economic performance through this and other
altemative  techniques is discussed more extensively  below.
The Virtues of Annual Pay Agreements
Both the German  and  Japanese  wage bargaining  have  revealed  relatively  little  inflationary
tendencies. This appears to follow, in part, from the fact that in both countries  most wage bargaining
occurs on an annual basis, namely, the wage terms of labor contracts extend for only one year.  In
addition, in  these  countries  there are  various  processes  which provide  coordination  across  wage  bargains.
These  coordinating mechanisms  seem to be  especially  critical  in avoiding  inflationary  pressures  (Soskice
1990).
In contrast, multi-year  labor contracts in the United States  (and some other countries)
reduce the influence  of contemporary  macroeconomic  factors on wage negotiations. In this way, multi-
year contracts  contribute  to wage rigidity,  a particularly  worrisome  problem during  economic downtums
(Wachter 1976). A countervailing  advantage  to multi-year  contracts comes from the fact that they limit
the possibility of costly strikes that might ensue in more frequent  bargaining, in effect, by reducing the21
costs and risks of bargaining. Yet,  the inflationary  tendencies  inherent  In multi-year  contracts  appear to
outweigh this virtue.
The Occupational Scope of Bargaining Structure
Another  important  aspect  of bargaining  structure  concerns  which  employees  are included
in unions  and other representation  structures. In Japanese  enterprise  bargaining,  white  collar employees
of the firm, below the executive  rank, are included as members of the union. In Germany,  whie  collar
employees  often press  their interest  through their participation  in the codetermination  processes  which
provide these employees  with the right to proportional representation  on the works councils and in the
election of supervisory  board members. In addition, white-collar  employees  in Germany  belong to the
same industrial unions as blue-collar workers.  The provision of representation  rights to white collar
employees  is an aspect of bargaining structure worthy of attention.  Both the German and Japanese
methods  of providing  white collar employees  with representation  rights are commendable. An important
industrial relations  task confronting developing  countries is to avoid representation  structures  that only
include "blue collarn  employees.
Recent Movement to More Decentralized Bargaining Structures
In recent years in very many industrialized  countries there has been movement  tcward
more decentralized  formal pay setting and bargaining  structures. In addition, in nearly  all countries  there
has been  a shift  toward bargaining structure  decentralization  through  the elevation  in the importance  of,
and an increase in the variation of, the outcomes of plant level bargaining. Greater  variation appears
particularly  in the work rules and work practices  agreed to by union and company officials  at the plant
level.
Labor and management have turned to more decentralized  bargaining as a way to
develop  contract terms  that respond to their needs  and economic pressures.  As well, more  decentralized22
bargaining fits well with the shift towards new industrial relations practices such as team systems
discussed later In this paper.
The  current  worldwide  movement  towards  decentralized  bargaining  structures  are  evident
in a few developing  countries as well. During the 1980s,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  Malaysia,  Philippines  and
South Korea  have adopted elements  of the enterprise  union system.  While  Singapore  has achieved,  like
the Japanese,  a decentralized  system buttressed by some degree of coordination at the macro-level
through national  wage  councils, South Korea  is moving  towards  a similar  arrangement. Mal, ysia  permits
enterprise  unions, within an industrial  union framework  that allows enterprise  unions  to respond to their
firms unique economic circumstance,  but are able to rely on their industrial  affiliates  for support.
These  developments,  however,  are the exception  rather than the rule in the third world.
While it  is perhaps early to  evaluate the efficacy of these systems, unions still remain waak and
fragmented  in South  Korea,  Malaysia,  and the Philippines.  Furthermore,  it is unclear  whether  the benefits
of decentralization  observed in Germany,  Sweden,  and other nations will be realized  without attendant
improvements  in union security and related policies  in developing  countries.
The direction of structural change in Africa reflects trends in the opposite direction.
Restructuring  in many African  countries  (such Algoria,  Ethiopia,  Egypt, and Nigeria)  has produced more
centralized monolithic union structures,  with the attendant problems. Yet, recent (1991-1992)  political
instability  connected  with movements  towards more genuine  forms of democracy  may reverse  this trend.
By and large, the experience  of the industrial  countries suggests  that industrial relations  outcomes that
reflect economic circumstance  require decentralized  bargaining  that is over the long run supported by
strong unions and stable labor-management  relations.
E.  WorkDlace Issues
There have been numerous recent changes in work place industrial relations in the
advanced economies.23
Recent Restructuring In Industrial Relatiorn
In some countries recent  changes  amount to a fundamental  transfotmation  in  industrial
relations. It virtually  all countries, aspects of this transformation  have  appeared.
There are many dimensions to this transformation including a  shift in the focus of
industrial  relations  activity  away from the collective  bargaining  to the *strategic' and *workplaceu  levels
(Kochan, Katz and McKersie 1986).  In contrast to the traditional arms-length  and formal nature of
collective  bargaining,  the "new  industrial  relations  system involves  more continuous  and informal  relations
between  workers and  managers (Windolf 1989).  The  new  system often  Includes contingent
compensation,  team systems  of work organization,  enhanced  worker and union participation  in decision
making,  and employment security.
Contingent Compensation
Contingent  compensation  links pay directly  to firm or worker performance. The virtue of
more contingent compensation  comes from the fact that it provides  responsiveness  in wages to current
economic circumstances.  As Weitzman argues, if pay quickly responds to  economic conditions,
economic systems  are able to lessen  the need  for large  quantity  adjustments  in employment  and output
and thereby become less prone to stagflation  and related  macro economic problems (Weitzman  1984).
As discussed  earlier,  the presence  of annual  pay  agreements  rather  than multi-year  pay agreements  adds
a significant  degree  of responsiveness.  Yet it appears  that economies  benefit  further from the presence
of direct linkages between pay and measures  of firm and/or worker performance. The use of annual
bonuses  that provide one-third  of total wage eamings in Japan provides  a virtuous high degree of pay
responsiveness  to economic conditions. It should be noted that for these bonuses to provide a macro
economic stabilization function they must vary with firm performance which does occur in Japan
(Hashimoto  1979). Other systems  would be well served  to develop mechanisms  that fit within their own
fr^,.ework to provide pay responsiveness.24
Team Systems
A second important Innovation  of many new work systems  is the shift to various forms
of shopfloor  and  office  teamwork  (Windolf  1989).  Traditional  assembly-line  organization  based  on isolated
work stations, it tums out, contains built-in limitations  on worker participation  and flexibility. Traditional
'fragmented t job assignments limit worker contributions  to production improvements,  commitment  to
product quality,  and capacity  for flexible  deployment  in the workplace. Japanese  team organization,  by
contrast, including cross-training, job rotation, integration of tasks, and regular team meetings, has
demonstrated  dramatic  potential for productivity  and product quality gains.
At the same time, unions  in Germany,  especially  IG Metall,  have  been promoting "group
work,"  both for its production improvements  and as a more humanis tic form of organization  (Tumer  1991,
pp.111-17).  The German version places an  emphasis on  broad  work assignments, broadened
responsibility  and autonomy  for the groups, as well as enhanced  skills training and broad upgrading of
group members.
Although  experience  with  teamwork  in  the U.S.  and Britain  shows  mixed  results,  evidence
from Japanese plants, from Japanese-run  plants in the U.S. such as NUMMI,  and from German pilot
projects indicates  that considerable gains are possible in productivity, quality, and flexibility, with or
without newtechnology  (MacDuffie  and Krafcik  1992;  Katz,  Kochan  and Keefe  1987).  Gains  are especially
likely when new work organization is associated  with extensive  skills training, so that workers are able
to integrato  tasks and solve problems  that arise, and with cooperative,  participatory  labor-management
relations.  Team or group systems are thus most likely to work well in countries such as Japan and
Gerrnany, that already  have strong institutional underpinnings for  training and  for worker/union
participation. In other countries,  it is necessary  to establish  such  underpinnings,  to promote  cooperation.
participation  and  training, along with  the introduction  of more  flexibleteam  or group forms  of organization.
The necessary underpinnings  can range from joint labor-management  committees  at the plant level  to
national legislation  to promote training and to establish some nationally  appropriate version of works
councils.25
Employee Involvement In Decision  Making
A third essential element of innovative  work systems and "new industrial relationsu  is
mechanisms  for employee and union participation.  The relative  success of Japanese and German
industry has brought  home the virtues of  employee and  union participation at various levels of
management  decision making.  As changing world markets and new information  technologies have
increased  the need for functional  flexibility  in the workplace,  production requirements  can no longer be
met only by armies of semi-skilled  workers  following orders. Japanese  and German  industrial  relations
systems, in different  ways, have offered strong mechanisms  whereby (i) workers, unions and/or works
councils actively  contribute their own ideas  to improving  the production process; (ii) employees  have a
better understanding  of the broader production  process  and are more suited  for flexible  d .ployment;  and
(iii) workers, unions and/or works councils receive  advance information  regarding  company plans and
participate in decision-making  processes,  and thereby often support company plans and help smooth
implementation. In an era in which innovation in both product and process has become increasingly
important, institutionalized  participation  often means that employees  and their representatives  become
allies of management  (rather  than enemies  or obstacles) in necessary  work reorganization.
A further push for increased  participation  comes  from the spread  of team systems  which
provide wider roles for hourly workers as they become involved in production control tasks.  Team
systems  and the administration  of new  employment  security  are also often associated  with a broadening
of worker and union involvement  in strategic  business  decisions. In part this strategic  involvement  arises
as a consequence of the major corporate reorganizations  that confront the workforce. After watching
plants close and work outsourced,  workers  and unions  have sought avenues  to affect  the decisions  that
weigh so heavily  on their future.
Difficulties In DIffusing Participation
The U.S., Britain  and France,  among other countries, have  weak participatory  traditions,
with industrial relations systems that do  little to  encourage either participation or intermal  flexibility.26
Historically,  managers  act (no one tells  me how to run my business"),  unions  react (and  often  fight
rearguard  actions  against  innovation),  and workers  are supposed  to do what  they are  told (but often
sabotage  innovation  in more  or less  subtle  ways). In these  countries,  a major  challenge  is to reform
industrial  relations  practices  so  that  new  participation  and  flexibility  are  possible,  in  line  with  the  demands
of contemporary  world markets. In the face of entrenched  insttutions  and practices,  however,  such
reform  is quite  difficult.  Reform  is underway  In all  three  countries,  but  the  pace  is halting  and  the  failures
are many  (Milkman  1991).
Japanese  and  German  firms,  by  contrast,  have  been  lucky:  firms  in  both  countries  operate
within  institutional  contexts  that  have  tumed  out  to offer  participation  and  flexibility  at an  historical  juncture
where  such  attributes  contribute  to market  success  (Katz  and Sabel  1985;  Soskice  1990).  As American,
British  and  French  managers  have  noted,  various  kinds  of employee  participation  and  functional  flexibility
have  been  shown  to improve  productivity,  lower  costs,  improve  product  quality,  and  increase  the  capacity
of firms  to change  product  offerings  quickly. Cases  of successful  reform  and innovation  within  each  of
these  countries  has  further  brought  home  the lesson  (Eaton  and Voos  1992). From  quality  circles  to
shopfloor  teamwork  to joint labor-management  committees  to financial  participation  to increased
employment  and income  security,  innovations  have been spreading  in unionized  and non-union
workplaces  alike.
The  crucial  dilemma  facing  firms,  unions  and policy-makers  outside  Japan  and  Germany
is not how  to import  foreign  models  but  how to adapt  and reform  established  institutions  and practices
to achieve  the necessary  participation  and flexibility.
Participation  can  be structured  in a number  of different  ways,  including:  works  councils
established  by  law,  informally  established  cooperation  through  enterprise  unions;  joint  labor-management
committees  established  through  collective  bargaining;  and quality  circles  and suggestion  programs  in
union  and non-union  workplaces.
It is important  to note  that where  unions  are  present,  they  need  to be fully  aboard  and
supportive  of the introduction  of new work  organization.  Management  strategies  that divide  the local27
union to force teamwork on a reluctant workforce are unlikely to work (Turner 1991).  Institutional
arrangements  that ensure union participation,  at least  at some level,  can facilitate  the labor-management
cooperation necessary  for the high-trust, innovative  modern workplace.
While  successful  in Germany  and Japan,  the patchy  track record  in the U.S., Britain  and
France suggests that  participation requires either legal  backing or  substantial protections and
encouragement throughout the  firm.  Workers and  unions need institutions with  clear rules and
protections  to allowthem to participate  in  firm decision-making  processes:  management  needs  thorough-
going  reform from the top  of the  or-anization to the  bottom to  instill commitment for employee
participation.  Both sides need training in participatory processes  and trust building to set successful
participation  in motion.
The role of middle management  is especially  important in this regard.  It is here that
employee  participation  is most often perceived  as threatening  to established  prerogatives,  and it is at  this
level that participation  often fails or is sabotaged. Yet middle managers  have a crucial role to play in
participatory processes and can find  their  influence within the  organization enhanced rather than
diminished.  They therefore need extra training in the management  of participation,  along with special
encouragement,  protections and clarity about their own (often quite new) roles.
Participation  is most likely  to succeed if it occurs and is reinforced  at all three levels of
labor-management  interaction in the firm: at the strategic level,  in r'gotiation  and agreement  between
top management  and union leadership;  at the functional level, in collective  bargaining  agreements  and
contract enforcement;  and at the workplace level,  in team or group organization  and other meaningful
participation  programs  that have  the full support of the organization  and its management. National  labor
policy can play an especially important role in encouraging  the spread of participation,  through efforts
ranging from education to specific incentives  to enabling or even mandating  legislation.28
Employment Security
There appears to  be a direct link between participation, employment security and
workforce  flexibility  within the firm. To the extent that  workers participate  in decision-making  processes,
they become more flexible  in what they are both able and willing to do in production processes. And to
the extent that they have employment security,  employees  are often willing to go along with even the
most radical  shopfloor innovations.
The generation  of employment  commitment  to company  goals requires  that employees
face the prospect  of continued employment  with their firms. This is particularly  important in light of the
spread of team systems  and the development  of more firm specific  skills. In the presence  of these skills,
employees become less attractive to the extemal labor market (Osterman 1988; Marsden 1990).  If
employees  do not then receive  more security from the firm, they may well be reluctant  to acquire more
extensive  skills and training, or participate  in the sort of shop floor decision making  that is so crucial to
the maintenance  of competitive  and high quality products.
Employment security can come in a variety of forms.  In Germany, there has been a
longstanding  and successful  requirement  that if firms seek  to reduce  the size  of their workforce  they must
first negotiate social plans with their work council.  These  social plans then outline the compensation
received  by redundant  workers and establish  guidelines  conceming  which workers  are to be laid off and
create other adjustment strategies. As a result, the German  system also has shown relatively  less use
of layoffs  as an adjustment strategy in the face of output declines.  The "intemal  flexibility' provided  in
the  German  system  through broad jobs and flexible  work rules  has created  the possibility  of more intemal
adjustment rather than recourse to extensive  extemal  adjustments  through layoffs (Sengenburger  and
K6hIer  1987).
In Japan, there is heavy use of the "lifetime  employment principle".  A relatively  high
percentage  of employees  spend long careers,  often their whole career,  with one firm (Cole 1979). The
key is that employees  are broadly trained and work rules are relatively  flexible. This makes it possible
for firms to make intemal adjustments to respond to reductions in product demand. These intemal29
adjustments  Include moving workers across parts of the enterprise, or in some cases even "loaning'
workers to other firms.
The use of intemal movements  is, of course, not without its limits.  In Japan, lifetime
employment  is afforded  to 'permanent' employees  but is not provided  to utemporary'  employees.  In the
German  system  as well, the use of foreign workers (particularly  In  the 1960s  and 1970s)  on limited  term
employment  contracts also helped facilitate  the less frequent layoff  of native  German  workers (Streeck
1984a). Other  forms of employment  security, ranging  from explicit  employment  guarantees  to retraining
and income  support exist in a number of countries  (e.g., Italy,  Belgium,  Netherlands),  and in many  cases,
the negotiation of such policies is linked to introducLion  of more flexible  work rules.
The argument here is that labor  and management  should  try to find mechanisms  that fit
with  their respective  institutions  to make  use of intemal  flexibility  as an altemative  to external  employment
adjustments. At the same time, it is unreasonable  to believe  that all extemal  employment adjustments
can or should be avoided.  The elimination  of the possibility  of layoffs  can (and in some countries has)
produced enormous inefficiencies  and rigidities.
Govemments should also  play a  role  in  providing inter-firm and  career mobility,
particulariy  during periods of slack economic growth and in regions or industries that confront abrupt
employment  declines. In Sweden,  for example,  there is a long history  of successful  'active labor market
policies' that have provided such assistance  and mobility  to workers (Meidner  and Anderson 1973).
The New Industrial  Relations and the Third World
There  is little  evidence  of  the emergence  of the 'new' industrial  relations  system  discussed
above in the third world. However, we can see changes in this direction in the newly industrializing
countries of Asia.  For example, Singapore has gradually moved to a system of considerable  worker
involvement  both in national as well as firm level economic decisions.  Enterprise unions have been
adopted in many Asian  countries as discussed earlier. Furthermore,  broad based training practices  are30
slowly taking root in Singapore,  Malaysia,  Thailand  and South  Korea, although much of the diffusion  of
these practices  is due  to the predom-nance  of Japanese  multinationals  operating in these countries.
Legislative  frameworks  aupporting worker participation  in management  decisions  through
works councils and joint labor-management  committees  do exist in many developing countries, (e.g.,
India, Anglophone  Africa).  And in Francophone  Africa,  unions have recently  been provided  with seats
in legislative  rule  making bodies  in parliament  (e.g., Benin,  Senegal). Nevertheless,  genuine participation
has not taken root  given the  absence of  supporting policies and  structures.  Despite the  legal
encouragement for employee  participation,  and the willingness  of unions  to participate,  the problems  of
weak and fragmented  unions, employer  resistance,  uneven implementation  of existing  labor legislation,
poorly educated workforces, and  most importantly, the absence of stable and cooperative labor-
management  relations, inhibit the development  of genuine participation.
F.  Tralning and Work Force Skill and Career Development
New workplace systems  in the 1990s  and beyond, based  on attributes  discussed  above
such as shopfloor  and office  teamwork,  employee  participation,  and career  development  in intemal  labor
markets, cannot succeed without broadly skilled workers capable of continual leaming (MacDuffie  and
Kochan, 1991).
The Need for Greater Investment In Training
The economic environment  has put a premium on industry's ability to produce goods
using batch rather than traditional mass production techniques,  and to make changes in product-mix
more rapidly. This has generated new demands on industry's training procedures.  More flexible
manufacturing  processes  often entail  the introduction  of sophisticated  electronically  directed machinery
(such as programmable machine  tools) and automated storage and retrieval  systems. These systems
can be most effectively operated by a workforce well informed of fairly advanced mathematics and
statistics.  The use of  team systems fits  into this network of  new production techniques as  the31
organizational  vehicle  through  which  workes take  on the responsibilities  to monitor  and often  diret
quality  control  and production  processes.
The training  needs  generated  by now production  and control systems  go beyond
traditonal  requirements.  Not  only  must  the worKforce  have  quantitative  analytic  skills,  it must  be skilled
in the use of computer  and other electronic  technologies. Furthermore,  team systems  require
communication  and  group  skills  to facilitate  the  operation  and  coordination  of  team  tasks.  Factory  studies
show  increasing  percentages  of skilled  workers,  many  of them  newly  cross-trained  (in  additional  skills),
accompanied  by declining  percentagas  of the traditional  semi-skilled  (see,  for example,  Milkman  and
Pullman  1991). Even  the latter  require  new  training  in organizational  skills  (for  teamwork,  participation,
job rotation)  and/or  more  substantive  skills  development  for the  monitoring  of expensive  microelectronic-
run machinery  (Kem  and Schumann  1984).
Training  and retraining  programs  have  therefore  taken  on  added  importance  throughout
the  Industrialized  world. This  is  true  both  because  of the  rapid  pace  of technological  change  itself,  which
means  that  employees  need  frequent  retraining,  and  because  of the  nature  of new  work  organization  and
technologies.  The  problem  for firms  and  govemments  is how  to build  up the necessary  pool of skilled
workers,  how to build up the abilities  and flexibility  of the less skilled,  and how to develop  reliable
structures  and incentives  for continual  training  and retraining.
Union  involvement  in  the  promotion  and  operaton  of  training  programs  can  be  a valuable
asset  in successful  upskilling  programs.  At  the firm  level,  such  involvement  can  encourage  cooperative
labor-management  relations  and  form  part  and  parcel  of the  building  of a *productivity  coalition"  (Streeck
1984b)  that includes  management,  union  and workforce.  Local  unions  and/or  works  councils  are  often
well  placed  to help  run  training  programs  in a way  that  appears  fair  and wins  the  trust  of the worktorce.
The German  Training  System
The  German  case  also  illustrates  the  constructive  role  that  unions  can  play  in  the  running
of a successful  national  system  of vocational  education  - as part  of a productiviy  coalition  at the macro32
level.  EstAblished  and supported  by  comprehensive  national  legislation,  and  funded  both  by  government
and  employers,  Germany's  vocational  education  system  offers  three-year  apprenticeships  across  a broad
range  of occupations:  blue and whie collar,  manufacturing  and service,  from bakers  to machinists  to
telecommunications  technicians  to hair  stylists  to pre-school  teachers  to equipment  programmers.  At  the
national,  regional  and local  levels,  the vocational  education  system  is tripartite:  employers,  unions  and
govemment  all  play  an  active  role  in  establishing  and updating  occupational  groupings  and  ensuring  that
training  programs  keep  up with  employer  and workforce  needs.
Because  unions  are  broadly  integrated  into  vocational  education,  they  are  committed  to
promoting  a highly  skilled  workforce.  This  commitment  extends  from the national  and regional  levels,
where  unions  help set recruitment  targets  based  on projected  skill needs,  to the plant  and firm levels,
where  works  councils  press  management  to hire  more  apprentices.  The  British/American  image  of craft
unions  that restrict  entry  to the skilled  trades  (to maintain  status  and pay  ievels  for the  already  skilled)  is
contradicted  by the  German  picture  of unions  that  actively  promote  widespread  skills  training.  In part  this
is  due  to the industrial  union  structure  of representation;  equally  important  Is  the  top-to-bottom  integration
of unions  Into  the running  of the vocational  education  system.
Employers  have  strong  incentives  to participate  in apprenticeship  hiring. The  in-school
training  that  apprentices  receive  is govemment  funded;  and  apprentice  wages,  paid  by employers,  are
low. The  employer  thus provides  on-the-job  training  and in return  gets  inexpensive  and often  energetic
and  flexible  young  labor. In addiion, the employer  gets  a multi-year  period  in which  to work  with  and
observe  the young  employee  as  a potential  permanent,  skilled  hire. For  employers  as  a group  (and  firms
participate  In the tripartite  goveming  bodies  through  employer  associations),  the national  system  of
apprentice  training  and vocational  education  assures  a steady  flow  of skills  on the labor  market.
The  nationwide,  tripartite,  comprehensive  system  of vocational  education  has  often  been
cied as a major  factor  accounting  for Germany's  industrial  success.  A highly  skilled  labor  force  is clearly
a central  component  of the  virtuous  circle  that  has  pushed  German  firms  upmarket  Into  "diversified  quality
producUon'  (Sorge  and Streeck  1988).33
The Extensive  Japanese  On-the-job  Tralning
In contrast  to the  German  system,  the  Japanese  rely  relatively  little  on  formal  apprentices
and yet accomplish  extensive  training  inside  firms. The  Japanese  production  system  includes  jobs that
are  relatively  broadly  defined  and workers  are  often  rotated  across  jobs throughout  their  careers.  These
production  techniques  are  facilitated  by  the  extensive  amounts  of on-the-job  training  received  by workers.
In addition,  skill acquisition  and work place  flexibility  are assisted  by the high levels  and quality  of
education  provided  In the Japanese  primary  and secondary  schools.
The  provision  of extensive  on-the-job  training  in Japan  is linked  to other  features  of the
Japanese  industrial  relations  system. The  long  tenure  of workers  in firms  provides  strong  incentives  to
both  workers  and firms  for investments  in training  by guaranteeing  retums  to training  investments.  In
addition,  the  heavy  reliance  on  seniority-based  pay  makes  job rotation  easy  and  thereby  facilitates  training
across  tasks  (Cole  1979).
First line supervisors  in Japan commonly  carefully  plan  workrs'  training  and career
progression.  Some  of this  planning  and  heavy  first  line  supervisor  involvement  takes  place  as part  of the
performance  and associated  merit  pay  that  covers blue  collar workers  in Japanese  firms  (Koike  1988).
Thus,  extensive  investments  in training  do not occur  accidently,  but rather  are linked  closely  to other
practices  common  to Japanese  firms (particularly,  the large  firms). In this way,  the Japanese  system
illustrates  the links  that exist  across  various  parts  of an industrial  relations  system.  Developing  countries
must  evolve  their  own methods  of employee  education,  both  through  the  education  system  and  through
training  in industry.
G. The Mlsmatch  Betwen Social, Educational  and Industrial  Relatlons  Pollees
In DeveloDing  Countries
The  previous  sections  have  shown  that successful  countries  have  managed  to achieve
an integration  of industrial  relations  policies  with  social  and educational  policies  in ways  that enhance
workforce  skill development  and facilitate  cooperative  labor  management  relations.34
Developing  countries  unfortunately,  exhlbits  littleintegration  across  policies.  Fundamental
mismatches  exist.  For example,  lacking appropriate  education and labor market policies, Malaysia  has
a labor surplus at the professional  level and a labor shortage at the skilled, semiskilled,  and unskilled
levels.  The Philippines  has a labor surplus at the unskilled level and a shortage at all levels of skilled
personnel,  primarily  due to emigration. This skill shortage ensures the continuance of low cost labor
intensive  production systems. Weak unions, and the absence of policies and structures  that promote
cooperative  industrial  relations  further ensure the continuance  of low cost, low skill production.
The absence  of unemployment  Insurance,  social security,  and skill development  via the
education  system  forces employers  in many  third world countries  to take on costs which in other nations
are handled by the government, thereby inhibiting the competitive position of employers wishing to
compete in the world mark.t.  Aithough many countries have apprenticeship  programs and Industrial
training systems  modeled  after Britain  and Germany,  the quality of training is below standard  for various
reasons,  most notably  because  of a lack of resources.  Developing  nations  need  to restructure  education,
labor market, and Industrial  relations policies to compete effectively.
There  are movements  towards the  ntegration  of educational  and labor market policies
in certain countries. Most of the NIC's (Korea, Singapore,  Malaysia),  for example,  are making  strides in
both upskilling  their workforces and ensuring  that the education systems  meet their industrial strategy
needs. South Korea,  having accomplished  this link, is now working on other necessary  social policies
such as the establishment of a social security system, although Korea has not yet articulated an
appropriate industril  relations  policy.
Singapore has achieved  effective links between Industrialization,  social, education  and
industrial  relations  policies  and provides  an Interesting  lesson.  Having  invested  substantially  in education,
Slngapore was faced with continuing low labor cost labor intensive  investment  by foreign investors. In
order to attract more high technology based Investment  that would result In upskilling, Singapore  used
its wage policy. Wages  were increased by 12 percent for three years, successfully  driving out the low
cost producers.35
These  are,  unfortunately,  isolated  examples  In  the  third  world.  Some  of these  innovations
are  gradually  taking  root  in more  advanced  developing  countrles,  but  even  there,  not in  a  systematic  way.
Although  resources  are  a critical  constraint,  developing  countries  must  make  efforts  to integrate  various
economic,  social,  educational,  labor  market,  and  industrial  relations  policies  in  ways  that  will  enhance  the
abiliy to compete  in the intemational  economy.
H.  Concluslons
The  economic  pressures  facing  the  third  world  suggest  the need  for the restructuring  of
their  economies  and industrial  relations  systems.  But change  in industrial  relations  systems  cannot  be
accomplished  overnight.
History  has  shown  that  there  are  certain  key  moments  of transition  in industrial  relations
systems,  after  which  they  get set and are  hard  to modify. Often  these  key  moments  are  as a result  of
legislative  changes  (e.g.,  the establishment  of the National  Labor  Relations  Act and the emergence  of
public  sector  unions  after  the burgeoning  of public  sector  legislation  in  the  United  States).  Other  factors
are also important  in facilitating  industrial  relations  system  change,  such  as important  historical  or
economic  junctures  (e.g.,  the post  war  reconstruction  in Germany  and  Japan  were  significant  moments
of Industrial  relations  transition).
In the developing  world,  previous  key moments  of national  transition  have  been the
independence  movements  in the late 1940s  (India,  Pakistan),  1950s  (Malaysia,  Singapore,  and many
African  countries)  and the early  1960s.  Transitions  in industrlal  relations  have  also occurred  in  the NIC's
due to shifts  of industrial  strategy:  for example,  the shift  to an export  oriented  industrialization  strategy
from  an import  substitution  strategy  has  resulted  in far reaching  and fundamental  changes  in industrial
relations  In Malaysia,  Philippines,  South  Korea,  and Singapore.
The  recent  pressures  for structural  change  in  the developing  world  present  yet another
opportunity  for major  transitions  in industrial  relatlons. A key question  is whether  countries  will take
advantage  of this opportunity.36
Another  important  issue  Is  the need  to recognize  that  various  industrial  relations  policies
and procedures  fit together  and reinforce  one  another  (i.e.,  the systemic  nature  of Industrial  relations).
For example,  changes  in pay systems  have  implications  for work organization.  Work organization
meanwhile  has  strong  Implications  for employee  participation  and  skill development.  The  choice  then
is not just to emulate  elements  of Industrial  relations  policy  from the experience  of the Industrialized
countries  and  make  incremental  adjustments,  but  rather  to strive  for the reconstruction  of entire  systems
so various  new  policles  fit  together  in  ways  that reflect  the  unique  institutional  background,  politics,  and
history  of each  country.  Therefore,  we  are  not suggesting  that Germany  and Japan  are  the best  models
for the third  worid  and Eastern  Europe. However,  we use  German  and  Japanese  examples  to highlight
successful  linkages  between  industrial  relations  policies.
This  paper  emphasizes  the  goals  of  an  industrial  relations  system  and  the  systemic  nature
of Industrial  relations. Most Importantly  we emphasize  the necessity  of coordinating  and integrating
industrial  relations  policy with other economic,  social, educational,  and legal  policies. Developing
countries  must  develop  their  own unique  institutional  mechanisms  to achieve  these  goals.  Perhaps  the
points  made  in this  paper  will  serve  as  a guide  to the principles.
While  It is clear  that many  often  far reaching  changes  are  necessary  to bring  about  the
alignment  of industrial  relations  systems  with current  economic  pressures,  the process  through  which
change  occurs  also  is important.  For  one  thing,  the  process  of change  has  to be  managed  so as  provide
for the active  participation  of the parties. Participation  can help to achieve  the necessary  popular
acceptance  of changes.  Experience  has  consistently  shown  that  the  top down  introduction  of Industrial
relations  change  (whether  it Is  policy  at the national  level  or systems  at the company  level)  fails  without
popular  acceptance  of the need  for change  and parUcipation  in the  change  effort. For many  developing
countries,  the changes  required  in industrial  relations  involve  a "quantum  leap",  implying  a long  gestation
period  (our  views  are based  on the establishment  of stable  and flexible  labor  management  relations  in
the  long  term).  Therefore,  change  efforts  should  have  clear  long  run  goals  but must  also  address  issues
of transiton  in  the short  term. A stage-wise  approach  to systems  of ^best  practice 3 may  be  appropriate.37
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